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INTRODUCTION 
 
Deforestation remains one of the most intractable environmental problems of today.  
About one third the size of the original forest cover has disappeared so far. Despite 
continuous efforts by the world community to curb this process, deforestation continues 
unabated in most parts of the world, with serious consequences for the human 
livelihoods, eco systems, and global climate. 
Pakistan also faces serious problem of depletion of its forest reserves. 
Approximately 39000 ha of forest are being cleared every year1. If deforestation 
continues at this pace, it is feared that Pakistan will lose most of its forest within the next 
thirty to forty years. Being a forest poor country, with forest occupying less than 5%of 
total land area2, protection of its forest resources is a vital task.  
Forest management faces many challenges in Pakistan. Forests face tremendous 
pressure, not only from a population of 160 million people for meeting their needs3 (be it 
only subsistence needs), but also from market forces which have seen soaring timber 
prices for many years now. Forest department is ill equipped to counter these challenges. 
It lacks human and financial resources, and relevant technical expertise. 
The general perception among planners is that over population is the primary culprit 
behind forest degradation. Moreover, people living close to forestlands, and using it for 
their needs, show an imprudent behaviour towards these forests and use it in an 
unsustainable manner. So there is tendency among the policy makers to find ways of 
keeping people away from this resource, and to strengthen government’s hold over it4.  
                                                 
1 FAO (2001).  
2 Total forest area of Pakistan is a mere 4.2 million ha, which is 4.8% of total land area. 
3 In 1998, the total wood consumption in Pakistan was 33,018 thousand cubic metres. Total wood 
produced was only 350 thousand cubic metres [Compendium on Environment Statistics (1998)]. 
4 This view is reflected in the Forestry Sector Master Plan (1992). This is an operational document 
for the sector, prepared with assistance from the Asian Development Bank. It is considered as the first 
comprehensive plan for forestry sector. 
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This is a rather simplistic (and problematic) conception of the issue5. Firstly, these 
assertions are subjective opinion of the policy makers, not based on any systematic 
analysis. Secondly, since most of the forests6 in Pakistan are state owned/managed, and 
responsibility for the protection/conservation of these forests rests with the state, 
therefore, any inquiry into the causes of forest degradation in Pakistan must analyse the 
state’s role in it. Putting the entire burden of deforestation on ‘other factors’ shifts 
attention away from more important causes (namely, failure of government to manage 
forests), and leads to wrong policy conclusions. This study intends to focus attention on 
this important factor behind deforestation - the role of state in forest degradation in 
Pakistan. 
 
2. FORESTRY IN PAKISTAN 
 
2.1 Geographical Coverage: 
The total forest area of Pakistan stands at 4.2 million hectares, which makes about 
4.8 percent of total land area7. Forests are largely concentrated in the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), approximately 40 percent of total forest area. The rest is shared more 
or less equally by other provinces8 (Baluchistan 14%, Punjab 14.4%, and Sindh 9.4%, 
Northern Areas 15.7%, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) 6.5%). Table 1 gives 
information about forests area and its distribution across provinces. 
 
Table 1: Forests Area by Province (‘000 ha) 
 
Forest Class AJK Balochistan NA NWFP Punjab Sindh Total 
Forest Area 275 592 666 1684 608 399 4224 
Total Area 1330 34719 7040 10174 20626 14091 87980 
% Tree Cover 20.7 1.7 9.5 16.6 2.9 2.8 4.8 
Source: Pakistan (1992) [Forestry Sector Master Plan]  
                                                 
5 Especially in present day climate when deforestation is no more considered as a simple 
phenomenon.  Contreras-Hermosilla (2000) writes,” It is a very complex combination of market failure, 
negative elements introduced by various policy and institutional failure, and some fundamental features of 
societies, such as distribution of political and economic power, and cultural factors, that lead to forest 
decline”. 
6 Approximately 85% of total forests are state owned. Apart from that, state also manages most 
privately owned forests as well. 
7This estimate is taken from the Forestry Sector Master Plan (FSMP) (1992). It combines 
information from various source which are: FSMP Satellite imagery interpretation for coniferous, scrub, 
and mangrove forests, and for irrigated plantations; Government records for riverain forest and linear 
plantations; FSMP’s farmland tree survey, FSMP allowance for miscellaneous tree planting which is too 
young to be seen on satellite images. This estimate differs from earlier figure quoted by government 
sources which was 5.4 percent of total land area. The problem with this earlier estimate is that it considers 
forest area as that area declared so by the government and does not refer to actual forest cover. FSMP may 
not be accurate but is more reliable since it largely relies on satellite imagery to estimate forest area. 
8Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Northern Areas do not have the status of province. AJK is a 
separate state with its own administration; Northern areas are tribal areas under the administrative control 
of the Government of Pakistan. 
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Main forest types are coniferous and scrub forests. However, economically 
coniferous forests are more important as they provide the nation with the bulk of timber, 
about 60% of total timber comes from these forests. They also serve an important 
function of protecting the northern upland watersheds. Scrub forests mostly cater to the 
fuel-wood needs. Farmland trees9 are the next important feature of forestry sector. 
Although, at present, they form a smaller portion of total forests, but productivity wise 
they are out stripping other forest types, accounting for almost 53% of total forest growth 
[Pakistan (1992)].  
 
2.2 Administrative Set up 
Forestry administration is decentralized to a large extent. Provinces are responsible 
for “planning and implementation of forest and range management programmes” (FSMP 
1992). Long-term policy, however, is a federal responsibility. The sector comes under the 
jurisdiction of Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural Development at 
the federal level. Provinces have separate minister for forestry. Each province has a forest 
department which is responsible for the administration of the sector.  
Forest Departments were created around 1870 by the colonial administration. They 
had the mandate of demarcating and preserving the forests and of earning revenues for 
the state from timber production. Much has changed in terms of their job assignment 
since then. Now they are responsible for wildlife and biodiversity protection as well, but 
for all practical purposes, their focus is still on forest protection, forest harvesting, 
revenue collection, reforestation, and soil and water conservation. Forest Department 
administers its daily affairs on the basis of forest working plans. These are medium term 
(10-20 years) planning documents.  
All forests are exploited on the basis of sustained yield model. Two types of 
management systems prevail at present. Forests located at higher elevations (moist 
temperate forests) are managed under the selection system, based on long rotations of 
100-120 years and regeneration periods of 20-30 years10. Forests at lower elevations 
(sub-tropical forests) are managed under uniform shelter-wood system in which canopy is 
opened up uniformly over an area. Forest Department working plans prescribe the annual 
cut. In NWFP all harvesting and sale of wood is the responsibility of another public 
agency- Forest Development Corporation (FDC). FDC contracts out part of the operation 
to private contractors, which includes harvesting operations and transportation of timber 
to roadside11. 
                                                 
9Farmland trees refer to trees grown of private farms, either in rows on agricultural farms or as block 
plantations. 
10 This system evolved out of necessity because a permanent cover had to be kept on steep slopes. 
11Before the creation of FDC in 1977, FD used to sell standing volume of trees to private 
contractors. The contractors could then cut more trees than those marked by the FD. Reports of large illegal 
removal of trees led to discontinuation of this practice in 1973. 
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The government relies on forest legislation to enact its policies. The principal 
legislation is the Forest Ordinance 200212. The forest legislation in Pakistan is regulatory 
and punitive in nature. Its main function has been to prevent and punish abuse of public 
forests. Forest law is considered to be the main tool in the hands of the forest service to 
ensure rational behaviour of people towards national forests (Ashraf 1992)13. 
 
2.3 Legal Classification 
Forests are mostly government property in Pakistan14. According to legal 
classification, forests are divided between public forests (state-owned) and private forests 
(non-state). The main categories of public forests are Reserve Forests and Protected 
Forests, while Guzara Forests constitute the main part of private forests15. These legal 
forest categories differ in terms of the rights granted to the local people. Following is a 
brief account of different legal classes of forests16. 
 
Fig. 1: Forests by Legal Classification 
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Source: Pakistan (2005) [State of Environment Report] 
 
Public Forests come under the jurisdiction of provincial forest departments that 
manage and control these forests. The major legal classes are Reserved Forests, Protected 
Forests, and State forests.  Reserve Forests17 occur in the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, 
and NWFP. These forests are almost free of private rights. The rights, granted as 
                                                 
12 Prior to this ordinance, the Forest Act of 1927 was the principal law regulating forestry. 
13 Enactment of forest legislation in the form of principal laws and acts used to be the subject of 
federal government. In 1973, the president of Pakistan authorized the governors of the provinces to make 
adaptations of federal law under the constitution (notification no. S.R.O 1328(1) 73, dated September 
1973). The provinces thus have full powers now to adapt and amend the previous federal laws on forestry 
and to make new ones. 
14FSMP quotes that about 85 percent of total forests are owned by the government. However, it is 
difficult, rather impossible, to give area estimates according to ownership type. The FSMP gives area 
estimates which includes both forests and parts of rangelands. For example, in the case of communal lands 
in the Northern Areas the figure stands at 2.98 million ha whereas the total forest area of Northern Areas is 
merely 0.67 million ha. 
15Forest Department has authority to regulate cutting in most of the private forests. 
16  See Ahmed and Mahmood (1998) for a detailed account of de jure and de facto status of different 
legal classes of forests in Pakistan. 
17 Reserved forests are the strictest tenure class where locals have no rights, rather some privileges 
are granted as concessions which can be taken away anytime. 
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concessions, generally include rights to passage, to water, to grazing and fuelwood 
collection18. Protected Forests exist in all provinces of Pakistan (except Azad Kashmir). 
Although under the ownership of government, they entertain a lot of rights of local 
residents19. These include, in addition to the rights mentioned above, rights to timber for 
non-commercial usage, lopping trees for fuelwood, and fodder. The important feature of 
these rights is that they are essentially meant to satisfy non-commercial needs. State 
Forests exist in Balochistan and Azad Kashmir. They are free of private rights but 
concessions for passage, grazing, water and fuelwood collection etc. are granted which 
can be revoked at any time by the government. Resumed Forests and Un-classed Forests 
are other categories of public forests20. Whereas Reserve Forests had been under 
government control for almost hundred and fifty years, Protected Forests were brought 
under government jurisdiction in late 1960s and early 1970s21. 
Private Forests have two broad categories: Guzara Forests and Communal Forests. 
Guzara Forests22 are community owned forests that were not declared as Reserved or 
Protected forests at the time of land settlement. These forests can be exploited for 
commercial purposes but they fall in the category of regulated forests as the Forest 
department regulates cutting in these forest. Communal Forests exist in the Northern 
Areas of Pakistan. They were owned by the local rulers before the annexation of these 
areas in 1972. They are now controlled by the forest department.  
 
2.4 Resource Use and Availability  
A daunting gap exists between total wood consumption and sustainable supplies of 
wood from the forests.  
 
                                                 
18Only includes fallen wood, and does not imply lopping branches for fuelwood. 
19 These forests were the result of failure of government to demarcate disputed lands. This 
declaration was used as an interim device to extend legal cover to the disputed forests till the process of 
settlement can occur. The settlement process is meant to examine the rights and claims of locals in detail in 
a judicial process. This judicial inquiry should result in acceptance, rejection or commutation on suitable 
payment of these rights. In latter two cases, the forest can then be declared as Reserved. A protected forest 
is therefore not a category where forests can remain perpetually. In the protected forest, in addition to the 
concessions mentioned in footnote 7, locals are allowed fuelwood collection and timber for personal needs. 
They also have 60-80% share in the sale proceeds from timber. 
20 Un-classed Forests await their determination of legal classification. Meanwhile they are treated as 
protected forests. Resumed Forests came under government jurisdiction after the land reforms. 
21 Bulk of the Protected Forests is found in the Malakand division. Prior to this, these forests were 
the property of the rulers of the princely states of Dir, Swat and Chitral. Protected Forests are also found in 
the Murree division in the Punjab. These, however, have a longer history under government control, and 
were constituted as a temporary category awaiting settlement at the time of the annexation of the Punjab. 
22 These are held either individually (by families), or jointly (by communities). However, they have 
always been managed by the government except for a short period of time (1981–1992) when these forests 
were managed by forest cooperative societies. For this reason, it is better to regard them as regulated 
commons (Azhar 1993). 
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Fig. 2: Wood Supply and Consumption 
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Source: Pakistan (2005) [State of Environment Report] 
 
Bulk of this gap is accounted for by the rural fuelwood consumption (Table 2 
below).  
Table2: Wood Use/Availability (‘000 m3 /year) 
 
Wood Consumption \Year 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Industrial Wood 3549 4280 5339 6419 7933 
Fuelwood Consumption      
Rural  36578 40385 44587 49228 54353 
Urban 6917 7636 8431 3909 10187 
Total Wood Consumption 50004 55569 61065 68940 76967 
Projected Sustainable 
Supplies From Forests 
8847 9506 12802 16099 19395 
Required from Other 
Sources 
41157 46063 49163 52841 57572 
Source: Pakistan (2005) [State of Environment Report] 
 
Whereas in 1993, sustainable wood supplies from the forests accounted for a meagre 18% 
of total wood consumption, by 2013 this would increase to about quarter of total 
consumption. Rest is covered by ‘other sources’. It is not clear, however, what these other 
sources are. Pakistan (1992a) reported that the annual outturn of wood from Forests 
(under Forest Department jurisdiction) stood at 686,000 m3  per year and the estimated 
consumption was 29,550,000 m3. It contended that this difference was covered by illegal 
removal of wood from the public forests. On a speculative note, one can say that bulk of 
the difference between wood supply and consumption today is covered by illegal 
removals. Clearly, there is not only an urgent need to come up with programmes to 
improve productivity of public forests but also a stringent regulation of these forests to 
guard them against wood theft.  
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Many explanations regarding deforestation in the mountainous regions of the sub-
continent are offered. Most current among these is the Theory of Himalayan 
Environmental Degradation [THED]. The THED ascribes deteriorating environmental 
conditions of the Himalaya region to the increasing population pressure in the fragile 
mountain ecological environment23. The second argument addresses the wider socio-
economic processes-especially urbanization of the lowland areas and the corresponding 
increase in the demand for timber. This also includes developmental activities and 
infrastructure expansion in the mountainous areas-particularly opening up of previously 
inaccessible forests due to construction of roads24. Alternatively, another strand of 
research underscores the political economy approach to resource degradation. For 
example, research has looked into the rent seeking activities of the communities residing 
in/around the forests as a source of deforestation25. Failure of the government to establish 
a proper institutional set-up for forest management has also been blamed as the cause of 
forest decline26. The unholy alliance between private forest contractors and forest 
officials leading to illegal logging activities has also been quoted as one important reason 
for forest decline27. Though these studies identify important aspects of deforestation, yet 
they fail to incorporate them in a broader framework. 
Contemporary research on causes of deforestation treats it as a multidimensional 
and complex process and distinguishes between direct and indirect causes [Contreras-
Hermosilla (2000), Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), Cernea (1992), Barraclough and 
Ghimire (1990)]. Direct causes are the acts of agents-loggers, miners, shifted cultivators, 
plantation owners, ranchers etc., who use forests for its diversified products (or convert 
forestland to alternative land uses). Indirect causes include factors that induce 
behavioural patterns of these actors28. These include market failures29; mistaken policy 
                                                 
23 See Ives (1987) for a review of the THED, and about its validity (or otherwise) in the light of 
available evidence. 
24 Ali et al (2005) estimate approximately 50% of the forest in Basho Valley (Northern Areas) 
disappeared after the construction of the link road.  
25 See Azhar (1993) for an excellent account of this proposition. 
26 See Hasan (2001) for this point. 
27 Knudsen (1996) takes a detailed look at the “entrepreneurship” of forest contractors in making 
profit out of the uncertain tenure situation in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. 
28 Barraclough and Ghimire (1995) consider that the forces behind the direct causes of deforestation 
are “complex, speculative and controversial” (ibid, p. 12) 
29 Forests provide many services (watershed protection, flood control, carbon sink) yielding positive 
externalities. Since a private owner of forest does not get any monetary benefit from these services, his 
private net benefit is bound to be less than social net benefit (benefits that accrue to the society). Typically, 
“many of the services provided by forests have either no market price or very imperfect prices and 
therefore do not enter into the decisions of the main private sector actors. For example, a forest landowner 
in an upper watershed does not get paid for the services his forest provides to other producers located 
downstream. These may include services such as soil protection against erosion and protection of irrigation 
and hydropower dams against sedimentation. Such services would then be produced at a level that is lower 
than the optimal from society’s point of view. By considering only those products and services that can be 
sold in markets or that can directly benefit private actors, many of the non-priced or imperfectly priced 
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intervention30; institutional factors (land tenure, illegal activities) and broader socio-
economic causes (population growth and density, economic growth)31.    
Fig.3: Causes of Forest 
Decline 
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Natural causes Resulting from 
human activities 
Market failures 
Hurricanes Un-priced forest products and services 
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Source: Contreras-Hermosilla (2000) 
 
More generally, environmental problems are often seen as stemming from 
institutional failures32. Therefore, study of institutional arrangements governing the use of 
resources has gained currency among researchers33. While the bulk of literature under the 
rubric of NIE has focused on explaining differences in the growth performances of the 
countries, and attributing it to differences in types of institutions34, lately researchers are 
using concepts and analytical tool of NIE to explain resource degradation problems 
                                                                                                                                                 
environmental services of forests simply do not enter into the decision making equation of the private 
operator. Because they have no market value, there is no private incentive to protect forests for their 
environmental services. In all these cases there is a discrepancy between private and social costs and 
benefits. Benefits and costs that are important for the society as a whole are not important for the private 
individual that controls the management of forest resources” [Contreras-Hermosilla (undated)]. 
30 For example government transportation policies, hydro-power policies, subsidies affecting 
alternative uses of land (cattle ranching), debt accumulation, and structural adjustment policies all affect 
forest use.  
31 See Rao and Marwat (2003) for a discussion of direct and indirect causes of deforestation in the 
case of Pakistan. 
32 Market failures and state failures are two instances of institutional failure. 
33 This interest in the study of institutions is revoked by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
school of thought33, which accords a central role to institutions in an economy. Institutions, broadly defined 
to mean rules and constraints, are the framework within which human interaction takes place (North 1990). 
They govern behavioural relations among individuals and groups (Nabli and Nugent 1989). 
34 North (1990) is the most coherent work. Also see Harris et al (1995). See Aron (2000) for a 
review of literature linking growth and institutions. 
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worldwide. Generally, focus is on the institutions of property and their role in resource 
degradation35. Deforestation is also cast in terms of institutional failure. Among the main 
reasons for deforestation, market failures and governance weaknesses are considered as 
most important (Contreras-Hermosilla 2000). 
In a wider context, development economics (typically, NIE approach) focuses on 
gover
 state failures. Though, it is too broad a topic 
to be
UNDERSTANDING STATE FAILURES IN FOREST MANAGEMENT IN 
“Weak and ineffective government institutions unable to 
monitor and enforce regulations also derive deforestation 
mechanisms” (Atje and Roesad 2004) 
                                                
nance failures as a probable cause of underdevelopment of the third world 
countries. Though no formal definition of governance failure is offered, one can borrow 
from Krueger’s (1990) definition of government failure, who describes it as the sum of 
actions and/or failures to act which result in sub-optimal situations (Krueger 1990)36. 
Further, Khan (1995) distinguishes between two types of state failures. Type I state 
failures are those where “a particular formal institutional structure results in lower net 
benefits for society compared to an alternative structure”. This he labels as structural 
failure. Type II failure occur when “the process for changing the structure of institution 
attains a lower cumulative set of net benefits for the society compared to an alternative 
process over a given period” (Khan 1995). 
The focus of this paper is on studying
 encapsulated in one paper, the idea perhaps is to start discussions on outlining a 
holistic, as against a piecemeal approach toward process of deforestation in Pakistan37.  
The study of state failures would then entail studying government actions that resulted in 
sub-optimal net benefits from the forests. The underlying hypothesis is: the primary cause 
of deforestation in Pakistan is failure of state to establish a system that would ensure 
proper exploitation of forest resources. The working hypotheses are: (1) The process of 
government control over forests created a discordant structure of property rights; (2) 
Government was pitted against the community and social recognition of state property 
was absent, which made forest management an impossible task; (3) Massive deforestation 
on part of the government exacerbated the dwindling state of public forests; (4) 
Management failures placed forest contractors in a comfortable alliance with the FD 
causing excessive felling. Below we discuss these instances of state failures. 
 
PAKISTAN 
 
35Inadequate property rights are blamed to be the culprit in most instances of resource degradation. 
See Hanna and Munasinghe (1995) for this point. The most researched area in the present context is the 
effect of different types of property rights on resources. The debate about private property vs. common 
property is one of the most heated debates in economics. 
36 The term governance failure was coined by development economist/practitioners to account for 
the institutional causes of lack of development. Though in currency, one fails to find an exact definition of 
the term. The term government/state failure is much precisely defined. 
37 Ideally, such an approach should also cover ‘market failures’, but these are not examined in this 
paper as the task would require valuation exercises.  
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A Complete Lack of Unders
Ownership over resourc minantly communal 
ingh (1986)]38. Generally, all land was considered to be the property of the ruler who 
 
not a
usufruct rights to the communities), the British used this 
‘mon
r to it. This act regulated 
peasa
idespread protests by them. Locals could no more 
exerc
                                                
tanding about the Pre-existing Tenurial Arrangements 
es in the pre-colonial India was predo
[S
claimed absolute ownership and people only had usufruct rights. As such, people were
ware of the concept of private property. Forestlands were held under similar 
arrangements. The local communities used the forest products at will and the rulers never 
interfered with the exercise of these rights. [Azhar (1993), Bilal, Haque and Moore 
(2003), Cernea (1990), Gadgil and Guha (1995), Guha (1993, 1989), Mumtaz and Nayab 
(1992), Singh (1986)]39.   
After advent of the British, the process of land settlement was started around the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Since traditionally the ruler claimed absolute ownership 
over land (and granted 
archical claim’ to establish its control over land. Through an ‘act of the state’, they 
acquired land in the name of the crown40.  The process of acquisition was twofold. 
Whereas in the tilled area (called ‘revenue lands’) it granted propriety rights to 
zamindars, no such provision was made in the forestlands41.  
Though the state had extended its control over forests as early as the 1850s, it was 
not until some twenty years later that a regulatory procedure, in the form of the Indian 
Forest Act of 1878, was established to provide legal cove
nt access to the forests, restricting it to areas not deemed commercially profitable. A 
forest department was set up to regulate tree felling in the areas brought under 
government supervision.  In addition, the forest department was also entrusted with the 
task of policing forests. Punitive sanctions were introduced against transgressors. [Guha 
(1993), Banuri and Marglin (1993)].  
This abrupt extension of state control conflicted with the customary use of the 
forest by the people residing there. It provoked them because it had caused infringement 
of their customary rights and led to w
ise their rights with same freedom. In the case of Reserve Forests the infringement 
was severe, as they could not cut trees any more. For Guzara Forests they had to seek 
permission from the government for the exercise of same rights [Azhar (1993), Guha 
(1993)]. 
 
38 He estimates that approximately 80% of the land was under some kind of common property 
arrangement. 
39 See Azhar (1993) regarding customary rights in Northern Punjab, Bilal, Haque and Moore (2003) 
for Northern Areas and Rome (2005) for Swat and Kalam (NWFP). 
40 The first instance of this act was applied to Bengal (Bengal Regulation I of 1824). In the coming 
twenty five years this act was extended to other areas as well. This law later on led to the Land Acquisition 
Act 1894. 
41 It is claimed that motives behind this act were of revenue maximisation. Granting private rights 
over agriculture land was considered optimal for output increase. Whereas this was not the case for forests 
as granting private rights over these would rid the state of a profitable opportunity to exploit forests 
commercially.  
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A Discordant Structure of Property Rights 
 
“Deforestation is encouraged by weak or non-existent 
s. The lack of enforcement of property 
rights induces landless peasants and others to use forest 
resou
 
Initially the forests were
wastelands. In the Murree an , the most well 
stocked forests (commercially profitable) were declared as Reserve Forests, and those 
that w
 with ease. In fact 
gover
eeds, subject to prior governmental approval. The government itself 
retain
                                                
ownership right
rces as a free resource. The incentive for deforestation 
is clear.” [Contreras-Hermosilla (undated)]. 
 divided in two categories: the Reserve Forests and village 
d Hazara division of the Punjab, for instance
ere not well stocked were left for the local population to meet their requirements. 
The village wastelands were later labelled as Guzara Forests. The Reserve Forests were 
almost free of rights of locals. The rights of passage, water use and grazing and fuelwood 
collection were allowed as a concession. In the Guzara Forests, in addition to above 
stated rights, local people were allowed to make use of the forest for liquidation of debts 
and the education of their children; moreover they could exploit the forests for 
commercial purposes on payment of a small fee to the government.42  
Since the purpose of state control of the forests was to safeguard state forests from 
misuse by the local population, therefore, a proper demarcation was essential in 
restricting people’s access. This, however, could not be accomplished
nment’s attempts at demarcation were met with protest from the local community as 
they contested the rights of the government, and struggled to assert their rights over 
forestland. Consequently the government failed to demarcate reserved forests [Azhar 
(1993)]. The government could only accomplish the task by leaving the disputed areas 
out of the reserve category. It had to constitute another category of forests to 
accommodate these disputed area, labelled Protected Forests.43 It was decided that 
demarcation would only occur when nature and extent of rights were thoroughly 
investigated. 
In the Protected Forests locals were given more rights. In addition to the concession 
they enjoyed in the Reserve Forests, the locals had rights to cut timber for their non-
commercial n
ed the rights to trees of spontaneous growth, and carried out large felling operations 
during this period for the building of local cantonment and the northwest railways [Azhar 
 
42This account of customary rights is taken from Azhar (1989). Also see The West Pakistan Forest 
Manual, Volume 1, Legislation Relating to Forest Administration with Rules made under Forest Acts and 
Regulations (1963). 
43Government Of West Pakistan in one of its report—The Report of the Murree Hills High Powered 
Commission; Lahore: Government Of West Pakistan, 1958—writes that the protected forest category was 
constituted because “it was a quicker process involving much less labour for the settlement officer and 
partly because the forests were burdened with rights which were recorded” [Azhar (1993), p. 126]. 
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(1993)]. Such felling in turn fuelled resentment among the right holders because they 
considered this as an infringement of their rights.  
Literature also reveals that Government efforts at demarcation were only half-
hearted44. As a result of this lack of effort there has been considerable illegal annexation 
of an
t 
   
f colonial forest management were 
essentially strategic, i.e. to meet the critical imperial need 
for wood for railways and during the world wars, and 
 
The historical account ontinent points out the fact that 
the forests were used for subsistence living, and commercial exploitation was an absent 
pheno
n of these forests on commercial basis. The 
Britis
es of establishing British control in the upper 
Gang
                                                
d encroachment on Guzara and state forests.  
 
Massive Deforestation on Part of the Governmen
“The imperatives o
commercial, i.e. to assure steadily increasing revenue to the 
state [Guha (1993), p. 83]. 
of the forestry in the Sub-c
menon [Ali et al (2005)]45. The nature-population balance was such that there were 
limited demands on the forests and grazing lands, and a number of studies talk about the 
virtually unexploited forests in many parts of the sub-continent [Tucker (1984), 
Schickhoff (1995), Simorangkir (undated)]46. 
The situation changed when the British took over control of the forestlands. The 
process of control was followed by exploitatio
h Government considered it an important source of timber and revenues [Guha 
(1993), Tucker (1987). Schickhoff (1995)]. “The exploitation was carried out mainly for 
the setting up of railways leading to the coasts, and for shipbuilding, so as to export 
products to Europe” [Singh (1986): 15].  
Tucker (1987) traces the first phase of massive deforestation in the Himalaya in 
period 1850 and 1860  to the ‘twin forc
es and Indus plains, and the penetration of that region by the railways” [Tucker 
(1987): 3]. And as a result of this expansion, “the overexploitation of the Himalayan 
 
44 Jan (1965) observes that “boundaries pillars ... ultimately disappeared due to lack of subsequent 
repairs with the result that the demarcation lines remain only on ... map” [Azhar (1993), p. 127). On the 
state of boundaries in the Murree-Kahuta forest division, Bashir (1959) writes that “in several forests ... 
boundary pillars were found missing and there was no clearly defined boundary line” [ibid, p. 127]. On this 
Muhammad (1972) later noted, “the reserved and protected forests were not even touched by the settlement 
officer” [Azhar (1993), p. 127]. Rome (2005) reports similar problems in the case of Swat where, due to 
lack of demarcation between forest and non-forest land, forestland was converted to cultivable land. 
45 Sheikh and Khan (1982) write that private forests of Chilas were not exploited on commercial 
basis before the partition of sub-continent. Irfanullah (undated) confirms that local population’s use of 
forest did not pose a threat to the forests. Saravanan (2006) also elucidates this point in the case of South 
India. 
46 Schickhoff (1995) writes, “In the seventeenth century and in the first decades of British 
occupation in the eighteenth century, the forests of India and the Himalaya were considered to be more or 
less untouched and inexhaustible” [Schickhoff (1995), 9]. 
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forests far surpassed that of the commercial timber cutting prior to the railway building 
era” [Schickhoff (1995): 10]. Table (3) below depicts that revenue from forests increased 
sharply in the next decades following the establishment of the Forest Department in 1870. 
 
Table 3: Revenue and Surplus of the Forest Department 1869-1925 
 
Period 
Yearly Average for the Revenue Surplus Percentage 
 1869-70 to 1873-74 
1879-80 to 1883-84 
5.6 
8.8 
1.7 
3.2
30 
36  
1
 1
4 1
1
1889-90 to 1893-94 
4
5.9 7.3 46 
1899-1900 to 1903-0 9.7 8.4 43 
1909-1910 to 1913-1 29.6 3.2 45 
1919-1920 to 1923-24 55.2 8.5 34 
1924 to 1925 56.7 21.3 38 
Sou
Himalayan forests were also a chief source of timber during the two world wars. 
Almost 400,000 sleepers of chir were export  Kumaun during the First World 
War, 
r 
 
Timber and Sanction 
rce: Singh (1986) 
 
ed from
and an almost equal number of sleepers (440,000) were supplied during the Second 
World War from the same forests [Guha (1993)]. Table (4) below describes that out-turn 
of wood from Indian forests doubled during the Second World War. 
 
Table 4: India’s Forest and the Second World Wa
Year Out-turn of Area under 
Fuel 
(in cubic ft) 
(sq. miles) 
1937-38 270 2 
1939-40 
Source: Singh (1986) 
 
The massive deforestation by the government generated feeling of resentment 
among the forest dwellers, who considered timber cutting as their prerogative, and 
comp
                                                
6253
64976 294 
1941-42 310 66538 
1943-44 374 50474 
1944-45 439 50440 
elled them to involve in excessive wood removal as well [Azhar (1993)]. Khattak 
(1994) also argues “large scale deforestation in the Malakand Agency was caused during 
the seventies by tenants who considered it inequitable for landlords to claim major 
benefits from forests even when they were not resident in the area [Khattak (1994), p. 
29]47. 
 
47 Also See Rome (2005) for this point. 
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State Vs the Society-the Competing Interests 
t holders feel uncertain about the 
continuation of their rights and concessions48. Being 
doub
 
Hill people in Asia are 
f power in the lowlands (Dani, Gibbs, and Bromley (1987)]. The extension of the state 
contr
rnea (1988b), 
Dove
 situation was worse in the case of protected forest which awaited settlement. 
The G
 small farmers hesitated to 
accept project planting on their lands. They were fearful of losing possession or control 
        
 
“Many righ
tful of the future, many right holders try to obtain 
maximum benefits in the present” [Ashraf (1992a), p. 44]. 
generally marginalised, sitting at a distance from the centre 
o
ol over the hilly forests exacerbated the social conflict between the state and its 
subjects. It pitched the state against the forest dwellers, and thus started the tenuous 
struggle over forest resources [Gadgil and Guha (1995), Tucker (1984)]49.  
Trust between forest dwellers and the Forest Department (FD) is lacking, to the 
extent that the FD is in open conflict with the majority of population [Ce
 (1994), Khattak (1996, 1994), Shahbaz and Suleri (2004), Van Dijk and Hussein 
(1994)]50. Opposition to forest management was expressed through the violation of forest 
laws, constituting a direct challenge to the state to relax its control over the forests [Guha 
(1993)] 51. 
The government claimed legal title over the forests but the locals made competing 
claims. The
overnment of Pakistan in its report on the state of forestry in NWFP admits that the 
disputed status of Protected Forests has affected its management [Pakistan (1992)]. The 
local people “do not allow the FD to plant areas from where mature trees are removed. 
Natural regeneration fails to get established because of ubiquitous grazing. The forests 
are not demarcated and the local people promptly appropriate any sizable opening in the 
forests for cultivation” [Van Dijk and Hussein (1994), p. 41].  
Resistance by the local people to active management by the FD is common. Cernea 
(1988b) writes that in a social forestry project in the AJK, “the
                                         
48 Ashraf (1992a) reports that this uncertainty is due to “a) repeated declaration by the government 
of its intention to forfeit the rights; b) informal and wrong seizure of parts of communal forest land by the 
influential persons; and c) over use of land and over cutting of trees by a few politically and socially 
powerful right holders in a manner that others are unable to exercise their rights” [Ashraf (1992a)’ p. 44]. 
49 Gadgil and Guha (1995) write, “Throughout the colonial period, popular resistance to state 
forestry was remarkably sustained and widespread” [ibid, p. 85]. 
50 In the case of Kumaon Village, Tucker (1984) writes that people saw the forest Department as a 
machinery of repression.   
51 The feeling of apathy is not one way. Dove (1994) notes that “the FD has an attitude of mistrust 
towards local population and attributes overexploitation of tree products and deforestation of forested area 
to the ‘anti-tree’ attitudes of the rural people. Up until recently, state foresters maintained that farmers were 
not merely the enemies of the forest (i.e., the state forests), but they were also opposed to trees per se” 
[Dove (1994), p. 107] 
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over 
meet the 
house
d under the authority of the FD, 
the lo
nsure a 
ontinuous flow of services from the resource without harming it. In the current 
, transportation and sale is 
the re
                                                
their land to the government once it was planted by the FD, or being deprived of 
their rights to collect fodder and graze their cattle.” [Cernea (1988b), p. 170] 52.  
Writing on the current degraded state of Hazara forests, Azhar claims that 
population pressure does not seem to be an important factor in the degradation of these 
forests. In 1870 the average household holding was 16 acres, sufficient to 
hold requirements. From this he concludes that the “prevailing atmosphere of 
antipathy towards the government and the forests contributed to the decline of forests”. 
Clearing forest lands to rid them of the state rights seemed logical on part of the right 
holders to ascertain their claims on these lands” [Azhar (1993), p. 120, emphasis 
added]53. Most studies on forestry talk of abuse of customary rights [Khattak (1996, 
1994), Azhar (1993), Ashraf (1992a), Cernea (1990)].54  
Khattak (1994) blames the inability of the government to carry out settlement 
process in the protected forests of the Malakand Civil Division as the major cause of 
forest depletion. He writes that “even when trees are felle
cal people generally do not allow them to plant up the felled tree areas in the fear 
that such planting would reinforce the claims of the government to the ownership of the 
forests” [Khattak (1994), p. 29]. With the result that those forest openings, which can 
sustain agriculture, are converted to cultivated land [ibid]. Uncontrolled grazing is yet 
another problem contributing to the decline of forest by hindering regeneration55.  
 
Management of Forests- The Contractor-Forester Alliance 
Crucial for the conservation is a proper management system, which should e
c
organisational set up FD marks trees to be felled, the harvesting
sponsibility of an autonomous government organisation, FDC (Forest Development 
Corporation).56 The FDC works in the Reserve and Protected Forests.57 Before 1973, FD 
used to sell standing volume of trees to private contractors, who were then responsible for 
 
52 The case refers to the pilot forestry programme under the Azad Kashmir Hill farming Technical 
Development Project in Pakistan, co-financed by the World Bank between 1978-83. Most of the farmers 
intervi
ive efforts at regenerating forests and 
plantin en 
hostili
ds. 
ewed indicated that they might offer small plots for project planting, provided they could be 
convinced that the FD would not alienate their lands and that they would be able to cut grass for their cattle.  
“In contrast, large landowners, being confident of their political power, did not regard tree planting by the 
FD as a threat to their ownership of land and trees” [Cernea (1988b), p. 170]. 
53 Rome (2005) writes that after declaring forest as government property in the state of Swat, 
“forests’ boundaries gradually receded upwards” [Rome (2005): 74]. 
54Pakistan (1992a), in fact, holds this abuse of rights as one of the main cause of forest depletion. 
55 “The greatest single factor vitiating the effectiveness of mass
g forest lands has been continuous uncontrolled grazing and lack of cooperation and often op
ty from the local people in this venture. Livestock roam free all over the forests...Where expensive 
fencing is installed, it cannot be effectively maintained against the will of the local communities. And even 
an army of forest guards cannot protect planted seedling from being surreptitiously uprooted by grazers 
from the areas which they consider their legitimate grazing grounds.” [Khattak (1996), p. 4].  
56The FDC operates only in the Province of NWFP. 
57In the protected forests local people are entitled to a 60 percent share in the sale procee
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felling and transporting the timber to the sale depots. Since these contractors were the 
owners of trees once these were sold out to them, they had an interest in felling much more 
than that permitted on a sustainable yield basis. The practice got defamed and was 
eventually stopped58. A Forest Development Corporation was then created in the province 
of NWFP for harvesting, transportation and sale of timber. It tenders out the service of 
felling and transportation to the private contractor. This practice differed from the earlier 
practice in the way that under this new arrangement the contractor does not become the 
owner of the trees at any moment in time. Therefore it was assumed that he would have no 
incentive to fell more tree than those marked-an assumption that soon proved to be wrong. 
This arrangement was adopted to counter the practice of over felling. Indeed, the 
GOP is satisfied that the FDC has put an end to over felling and “these arrangements 
have 
ration,59 
still e
. Under this system, the 
conce
d. Under this system FDC deducts the 
actual harvesting cost plus taxes from the sale proceeds after auction, the remainder 
        
effectively removed corruption that was common under the previous system of 
stumpage sale to contractors [Pakistan (1992a), section 4.4.4,).” Other authors do not 
seem to be in agreement [See Khattak (1996, 1994); Khan and Zurflueh (1994)]. 
A report by the Kalam Integrated Development Project (KIDP) identifies ‘the 
alleged collusion’ between foresters and contractors, a legacy of British administ
xists in the NWFP forestry department. “Especially poignant is ...(the) observation 
on the ‘alleged collusion’ between foresters and contractors. The government of NWFP 
took action against this in 1973, and disallowed the sale of standing trees to contractors or 
forest lessees. Later, in 1977, the FDC was created to act in the place of contractors. The 
overall situation, however, is said to have changed for the worse through the complex 
series of developments” [Khan and Zurflueh (1994), p. 2]60. 
The report describes the series of events as follows. In 1981, the FDC adopted a 
system of pre-fixed rates for the payment of royalty
ssionists were paid royalty according to the pre-determined rates61 that were agreed 
upon by all the parties. The system functioned well until the late 1980s, because FDC 
contracted out harvesting and transportation to labour contractors, who had no vested 
interest in over felling. The labour contractors made profits purely by working efficiently. 
The surplus revenue accrued to the government. 
In the late 1980s, when timber prices rose dramatically, and the labour wages 
followed suit, a system of net sale was adopte
                                         
58 Tucker (1982) writes, “Competition among the investors (contractors) was usually intense, and 
winning bidders became determined to squeeze maximum profits from their coupes. As the system 
matured, the hill people charged that contractors often cut many more trees than they had legally 
purchased, either by stealth or by bribing foresters… Senior officials of the FD were never able to 
effectively monitor their chronically underpaid subordinates” [cited from Khan and Zurflueh (1994), p. 2]. 
Also see Sheikh and Khan (1982) for destruction of forests in the Northern Areas by timber traders in the 
early years of Pakistan. 
59See Tucker (1984) for the malpractice in the forestry administration in the colonial regime.  
60 Mehmood (2003) notes the ‘timber mafia’ is still deeply entrenched in the state administrative 
machinery.  
61Implied rate per tree removed. 
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was 
 sale was poorly understood by 
rural 
, it came to depend upon the same contractors. Thus, the same situation 
of a 
ocument instances of state failures in the forest 
ector of Pakistan, and to build an argument that these failures are the primary cause of 
deforestation in Pakistan. Typical of control of the forests by the 
gover
split between the concessionists (60 percent), and the government (40 percent). 
This allowed more revenue to accrue to concessionists. 
“Contractors and (ex) forest lessees were quick to take advantage. Royalty 
purchasers entered as de facto contractors largely through the ignorance of illiterate 
majority of concessionists. This was easy. The new net
concessionists, and the purchasers guaranteed a fixed rate for standing volume of 
timber... Rather than to face the uncertainties of a perceived fluctuating market and 
uncertain tenure, concessionists opted for a fixed (low) rate. Royalties were purchased 
through influencing tribal elders, who entered into legal agreements on behalf of the 
tribe. Purchasers then registered their or relatives name as contractors with the FDC, and 
manipulated, the bidding to win the contract (emphasis added), at rates that no 
contractors not backed by a royalty purchase could compete with. Thus, they entered the 
same harvesting coupes as contractors that they had purchased.” [Khan and Zurflueh 
(1994), pp. 2-3]. 
They now have enormous interest in over felling, thus realising huge profits. The 
practice still continues. Although the FDC was established to eliminate the malpractice of 
forest contractors
close relationship between the FDC and contractors came to prevail [ibid, p. 5]. 
“Undermining the raison-de-ere for the establishment of the corporation” [Van Dijk and 
Hussein (1994), p. 41]. It further writes “The forest department gives high priority to 
forest conservation, but despite all efforts, the tremendous pressure on forests caused by 
high prices of timber and the demand for fuelwood and money makes it extremely 
difficult to save the forest. It is generally perceived that Forest Department Staff is also a 
threat to the forest” [ibid, p. 41]. This alliance between the forest contractor, forester and 
local influential is also very well documented in Knudsen (1996), which also provides 
interesting economics of this forest theft. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of the paper was to d
s
ly, the process 
nment paid little attention to the existing tenurial rights of the local people. The 
infringement of their rights due to the restrictions imposed on them infuriated the forest 
dwellers and led to considerable deforestation by them. On the other hand, the state 
invested little effort in establishing a property regime that could ensure an optimal 
exploitation of forests, which resulted in a discordant structure of property rights fuelling 
deforestation. Moreover, though the quantity restrictions had been imposed on the wood 
removal by the community, the state itself was involved in excessive timber harvesting 
for the construction of cantonments and railways and also during the World Wars. 
Finally, the management system and its system of contracts encouraged ‘collusion’ 
between contractors, foresters and local influentials, which led to the flourishing business 
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of the ‘timber mafia’. With the result that the local community considered it fair to take 
their share of the resource.  
We end this paper with the following quote from Contreras-Hermosilla (undated). 
“The management of a large proportion of the forest resources in many countries is 
entru
eferences 
ahmood (1998) Changing Perspectives on Forest Policy. Policy that works 
for forests and people series no. 1. IUCN Pakistan and International Institute for 
Al
s Causes in Basho Valley, 
An
 Febraury, 73-98. 
istan. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
stainable Forest 
Az
 Economic Development and Cultural Change 42:19 
Az
e Pakistan Development Review, 28: Winter, 643-651. 
ondon.                                             
sted to the Government. However, the institutional weaknesses of many of the 
Government agencies, particularly in developing countries, are well known. Very few 
technical and managerial staff with limited implementation equipment and facilities are 
asked to plan, manage and monitor developments in millions of hectares of forest 
resources often subject to a number of intense external pressures. It is no wonder that in 
many cases, but particularly in developing economies, forest resources are, for all 
practical purposes, considered as resources with "open access", with nobody exerting 
effective property rights on them” [Contreras-Hermosilla (undated)]. 
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